The Economic Unity Doctrine in the EEC: A Limited Exemption to Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome by Ward, Sarah M.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 9, Issue 2 1985 Article 6
The Economic Unity Doctrine in the EEC: A
Limited Exemption to Article 85 of the Treaty
of Rome
Sarah M. Ward∗
∗
Copyright c©1985 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Economic Unity Doctrine in the EEC: A
Limited Exemption to Article 85 of the Treaty
of Rome
Sarah M. Ward
Abstract
Section I of this Note analyzes the cases in which the Commission and the Court of Justice
have implied a doctrine of economic unity and argues that this economic unity exemption to the
prohibitions of article 85 may indeed be a limited one. Section II sets forth the theoretical and prac-
tical difficulties that such a limited economic unity doctrine entails. Finally, section III presents an
alternative analysis for determining when article 85 of the Treaty of Rome sould apply to practices
between related firms.
THE ECONOMIC UNITY DOCTRINE IN THE EEC: A
LIMITED EXEMPTION TO ARTICLE 85 OF THE
TREATY OF ROME
INTRODUCTION
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome' comprises one of the
basic elements of competition law in the European Communi-
ties.2 Article 85 prohibits agreements between enterprises,3
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC or Commu-
nity), Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English trans-
lation), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter cited as
EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome]. The unofficial English version of article 85 reads as
follows:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises,
any decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices
which are likely to affect trade between the Member States and which have
as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any
other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical devel-
opment or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in re-
spect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by
a party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
null and void.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplica-
ble in the case of:
- any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises,
and
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which con-
tribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to
the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an
equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not
indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of
a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
Id.
2. There are three legally definable, treaty-based organizations in the European
Communities (Common Market). See D. LAsoK &J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 12-25 (3d ed. 1982).
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They are the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 2 B.
HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPAR-
ATIVE GUIDE 1 (1985). The ECSC was created by tlhe Treaty of Paris in 1951. Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty]. The
EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. See supra note 1. Euratom was
created in 1957. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter
referred to as Euratom Treaty]. The European Communities originally consisted of
six member states: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became
members on January 1, 1973. In 1981, Greece joined the European Communities.
Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, 22 OJ. Eur. Comm.
(No. L 291) 9 (1979); Treaty of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portu-
guese Republic, January 1, 1986, 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 302) 9 (1985). Spain
and Portugal became Member States of the European Communities on January 1,
1986. See B. HAWK, supra, at 1-2; Bourgeois, EC Antidumping Enforcement-Selected Sec-
ond Generation Issues, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST., ch. 27 (B. Hawk ed.).
There are four principal institutions of the European Communities: 1) the
Council of Ministers, which is the principal body empowered to enact Community
law under the treaties; 2) the Court of Justice, which is the judicial arm; 3) the Com-
mission, which is the administrative or executive body; and 4) the European Parlia-
ment. See B. HAWK, supra, at 2.
The EEC's competition rules relating to enterprises are contained in articles 85-
90 of the Treaty of Rome. See D. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, supra, at 385-402. Article 85
is directed at agreements and concerted practices which have an anticompetitive pur-
pose or effect. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85. Article 86 prohibits a firm's
abuse of its dominant position "[t]o the extent of which trade between any Member
States may be affected." Id. art. 86. Article 87 confers broad powers on the Council
to enact detailed rules regarding competition. Id. art. 87; see D. LASOK & J.W.
BRIDGE, supra, at 385-86. Articles 88 and 89 contain temporary provisions to be in
force until the Council implements article 87. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 88-
89. Article 90 is concerned with the application of the rules of competition to enter-
prises of a public nature. Id. art. 90.
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1). It has been suggested that the proper
translation of article 85(1) is agreements among "undertakings" rather than among
"enterprises." Lazerow, Price Discrimination and the Treaty of Rome: The Jurisdictional
Elements, 23 FED. B.J. 147, 148-66 (1963). The official English version and the Com-
merce Clearing House (CCH) translation, in fact, use the word "undertakings"
rather than "enterprises." See 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2005. For present
purposes, however, the word "undertaking" can be considered as synonymous with
the word "enterprise." See A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 1 (1968).
Although article 85 speaks of "enterprises," the term has not been defined in the
Treaty. See C. BELLAMY & G.D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 23 (2d
ed. 1978). Nor is the term "enterprise" defined in the law of any of the Member
States. R. GRAUPNER, THE RULES OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNITY 11 (1965). It is now recognized that the term "enterprise" includes both
legal and natural persons engaged in activities of an economic nature. C. BELLAMY &
G.D. CHILD, supra, at 23; see H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY §§ 3-90 through 3-98 (1981 and Supp. 1984). The term is not
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decisions by associations of enterprises,4 and all concerted
practices that may affect trade between members of the Euro-
pean Economic Community5 (EEC or Common Market) and
that have the purpose or effect of restraining competition in
the EEC.6 By its very nature, an agreement or concerted prac-
tice necessitates more than one participant; each requires two
or more persons or entities that are sufficiently distinct to be
capable of conspiring or agreeing together. Thus, a restraint
on competition achieved by a single corporation lacks the plu-
rality of actors required for an article 85 infringement.
Neither the Commission,7 nor the Court of Justice,8 has
synonymous with the word "corporation" and is broad enough to include more than
one corporation. Natural persons are included only if they are carrying on activities
of an economic nature. The officers or employees of a corporation are not enter-
prises. See generally 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2011; Conclusions of Advocate
General Roemer in Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council and Commission
of the European Economic Community, [ 1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8048, at 7727 (1966); A. DERINGER, supra, at 5-8; H. SMrr & P. HERZOG,
supra, at § 3-93.
4. Article 85 also applies to "associations of enterprises." If an enterprise must
be involved in activity in an economic sense, see supra note 3, it necessarily follows
that an association of enterprises must also be economically active, even if only in
representing the economic interests of its members. See D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD,
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 258-59 (1980). It does not appear to be impor-
tant that the actual members of the association themselves be enterprises or their
representatives. See A. PARRY &J. DINNAGE, PARRY & HARDY: EEC LAW 317 (2d ed.
1981). An organization which forms part of a governmental activity may be an asso-
ciation of enterprises. See, e.g., Pabst and Richarz v. Bureau National Interprofes-
sional de 'Armagnac, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 231) 24 (1976), 18 Common Mkt.
L.R. D63. An international association whose members are comprised of smaller na-
tional associations may also be an association of enterprises. See, e.g., C.E.M.I.M.O.,
12J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 69) 13 (1969), 8 Common Mkt. L.R. DI. "Public" enter-
prises engaged in economic activity are also subject to the general rules of the
Treaty. See A. PARRY &J. DINNAGE, supra, at 317.
5. See supra note 2.
6. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85.
7. The Commission of the European Communities is the "administrative or ex-
ecutive arm" of the Common Market. See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 2. It was created
by the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 4. The Commission
may investigate and terminate infringements of articles 85 and 86. Regulation 17,
art. 3, 5J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 205-06 (1962), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401,
2421. The Commission may fine "enterprises" for violations of articles 85 and 86.
Id. art. 15. Commission decisions may be appealed to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities and the Court may cancel, reduce or increase the fine im-
posed by the Commission. Id. art. 17. The Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities is the judicial arm of the Common Market. It originated in the ECSC Court.
ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 45 (Protocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice).
The Court has two types of jurisdiction in the competition field: 1) review of deci-
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ever held that officers, directors, employees or divisions within
a single corporation are capable of agreeing with each other or
with the corporation in contravention of article 85. 9 However,
there remains the question of the extent to which coordinated
activity between a parent company and its subsidiaries or be-
tween sister subsidiary companies can be an agreement or con-
certed practice in violation of article 85. EEC decisions osten-
sibly reject the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, under
which agreements between affiliated companies have been
found.10 Instead, the Commission and the Court ofJustice es-
pouse a doctrine of economic unity." Under this doctrine,
sions of the Commission and 2) review of questions of Community law on reference
from national courts of Member States. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 169-83; B.
HAWK, supra note 2, at 2.
8. See supra note 7.
9. There has been no authoritative statement to the effect that article 85(1) can
never apply to coordinated activity between branch offices or divisions of the same
corporation, but the reasoning in Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
165) 12 (1969), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308,
supports this view. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; B. HAWK, supra note
2, at 74; Forcione, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Antitrust Regulations of the Common
Market, 25 Bus. LAW. 1419, 1432 (1970). It has been suggested that divisions or
branches could enter into an agreement prohibited by article 85(1) if they were act-
ing as independent economic entities. See H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 3, at
§ 3-98.
10. Intra-enterprise conspiracy refers to a conspiracy among separately incorpo-
rated units of a parent-subsidiary enterprise. See Note, All in the Family: When Will
Internal Discussion Be Labeled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy?, 14 Duo. L. REV. 63, 64 (1975).
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine has had a checkered history in United
States antitrust law under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982). However, in 1984, the United States Supreme Court clarified 40
years of ambiguous case law and held that a parent company and a wholly owned
subsidiary were incapable of conspiring together under section 1. See Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). The Court stated:
[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must
be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of
interest. Their objectives are common not disparate; their general corpo-
rate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate con-
sciousnesses, but one .... [Therefore], there is no justification for § 1 scru-
tiny.
Id. at 2742.
11. The doctrine of economic unity has arisen from a series of Commission deci-
sions and Court of Justice judgments that have emphasized the existence of eco-
nomic interdependence in exempting practices between related firms from the prohi-
bition of article 85. See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 1147, 1167, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at 9151-
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agreements or concerted practices between a parent company
and its subsidiary are exempt from the prohibitions of article
85 when the subsidiary does not determine its own market be-
havior. 12
The scope of the economic unity doctrine, however, re-
mains subject to dispute. Specifically, Commission decisions
and Court of Justice judgments relating to practices between
affiliated firms have failed to clarify what degree of control is
necessary to meet the requirement that the subsidiary does not
determine its course of action in the market.' 3 Furthermore,
both the Commission and the Court of Justice have undercut
the implication of a broad economic unity doctrine by sug-
gesting that article 85 may apply to agreements or concerted
activity between related firms, even when the firms are eco-
nomically interdependent, if these agreements concern some-
thing other than the mere internal allocation of tasks between
58 (the Court held that article 85 did not apply to agreements between a parent and
its subsidiary if "the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action
on the market"); Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), 1
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2412.26 (the Commission exempted practices between
a parent company and its subsidiary from the prohibitions of article 85 upon a find-
ing that the affiliated companies formed "one economic unit"). But cf Kodak, 13 0.J.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378 (the Commission stated that a parent company and its de-
pendent subsidiary were not capable of agreeing in violation of article 85 even
though it effectively found the required agreement).
In addition to applying to the issue .of finding an agreement or concerted prac-
tice between related entities for the purpose of article 85, the economic unity doc-
trine is also related to two other separate issues: 1) imputation of substantive liability
to foreign enterprises for the conduct of local subsidiaries, and 2) jurisdiction over
foreign enterprises. See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 54.
12. See supra note 11 (cases cited therein). The puzzling aspect of this analysis is
that neither the Commission nor the Court has stressed the absence of more than
one "enterprise" within the meaning of article 85 upon the finding that a subsidiary
is incapable of independent market behavior. Despite the language in these deci-
sions that a parent and its economically independent subsidiary form an economic
unit, the Commission and the Court have nevertheless referred to the parent and
subsidiary as separate "enterprises" or "undertakings." In this respect, the EEC
analysis of the intra-enterprise conspiracy question differs significantly from that re-
cently used by the United States Supreme Court in Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. 2731
(1984), when confronted with the problem of intra-enterprise conspiracy. See supra
note 10. The results achieved by the Commission and the Court with respect to the
intra-enterprise conspiracy question, however, are strikingly similar to that of the
Copperweld decision.
13. See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 75; H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 3, at §§ 3-
95 through 3-98.
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the enterprises. 4
Section I of this Note analyzes the cases in which the Com-
mission and the Court of Justice have implied a doctrine of
economic unity and argues that this economic unity exemption
to the prohibitions of article 85 may indeed be a limited one.
Section II sets forth the theoretical and practical difficulties
that such a limited economic unity doctrine entails. Finally,
section III presents an alternative analysis for determining
when article 85 of the Treaty of Rome should apply to prac-
tices between related firms.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ECONOMIC UNITY
The doctrine of economic unity has evolved from a series
of Commission decisions and Court of Justice judgments that
have emphasized the existence of economic unity in exempting
practices between affiliated firms from the prohibitions of arti-
cle 85.15 These decisions have focused on two prerequisites
for an article 85 violation. The first prerequisite relates to the
existence of an agreement or concerted practice between two
or more enterprises. 16 The second is the restriction on compe-
tition in the Common Market.'
7
14. See Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1167, [1974 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at 9151-57-9151-58 (the Court stated that one
qualification for an article 85 exemption was that the agreements or practices be-
tween related entities must be "concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks
as between the undertakings"); COMM'N FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
52 (1975) (the Commission stated that agreements between related firms may fall
within the ambit of article 85 where "they have wider implications, for instance
agreements which restrict the scope for non-member undertakings to penetrate a
given market"); see also COMM'N SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 39 (1977)
(the Commission endorsed the reasoning of the Court in Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, stating
that article 85 may apply to restrictive agreements between companies of the same
group if the agreements concern something other than the mere internal allocation
of tasks between the enterprises).
15. See van Rijn, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy and Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, in Es-
SAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 123, 126 (1982).
16. See id. This implies that there must be a plurality of actors that have entered
into a practice voluntarily. Thus, coordinated activity where only one person volun-
tarily consents, the other one having no choice but to go alone, should not be consid-
ered "agreements" or "concerted practices" within the meaning of the article. See D.
WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 4, at 253.
17. van Rijn, supra note 15, at 126. Both actual and potential competition are
included under article 85, as well as competition affecting third parties to the chal-
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A. Commission Decisions
The seminal decision on the economic unity doctrine is
Christiani & Nielsen.'8 In that decision the Commission focused
primarily on the possible restriction on competition within the
Common Market. In 1969, Christiani & Nielsen, a Danish par-
ent company, asked the Commission to issue a negative clear-
ance' 9 under Regulation 1720 respecting a market sharing ar-
rangement that the parent had signed with its wholly owned
subsidiary in the Netherlands. 2 ' In addition to containing a
territorial division, the arrangement granted the parent the
lenged agreement or practice. See Consten & Grundig v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Community, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 339, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7651. In that decision, the Commission stated:
"Competition may be distorted within the meaning of Article 85(1) not only by
agreements which limit it as between the parties, but also by agreements which pre-
vent or restrict the competition which might take place between one of them and
third parties." Id.
18. 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308.
19. Regulation 17 establishes and defines the powers of the Commission in the
competition field. First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 5
J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Regulation 17]. Under Regulation 17, there are three ways in which
alleged anticompetitive activity may come before the Commission. First, the Com-
mission may initiate its own investigation. See Regulation 17, supra, art. 3. Second,
the parties may notify, id. art. 4, the Commission of the agreement in order to get
either a "negative clearance," see id. art. 2, or an individual exemption, id. arts. 4-8,
from an article 85 prohibition. Third, complaints to the Commission may originate
from third parties. Id. art. 3(2). Under article 3(2), Member States and "[n]atural or
legal persons, who show a justified interest" are entitled to apply to the Commission
for review of an agreement, decision or practice for a possible article 85 violation. Id.
art. 3(2).
Under article 3 of Regulation 17, the Commission is empowered to require par-
ties to terminate an agreement which, acting on request or ex officio, it finds to be an
infringement of article 85. Id. art. 3.
Article 4 calls for the notification of "agreements, decisions or concerted prac-
tices referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1 .... ." Id. art. 4. Notification is required
in order to obtain an individual exemption under article 85(3). Id.
Article 2 provides that an enterprise or an association of enterprises may seek a
"negative clearance" from the Commission. Id. art. 2. "Negative clearance" denotes
a certification by the Commission that, "according to the information it has obtained,
there are, under Article 85, paragraph 1 . . . no grounds for it to intervene with
respect to an agreement, decision or practice." Id. The "negative clearance is re-
stricted to the facts in the Commission's possession at a certain time." Id. art. 2; see
B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 18.
20. See supra note 19.
21. Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12, 13 (1969), [1969-
1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308, at 8658.
380 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:373
rights to appoint the subsidiary's officers and to give directives
to the subsidiary, which was obliged to carry them out.22 The
parent, Christiani & Nielsen, Copenhagen, also had other sub-
sidiaries, two of which were located in Germany and France. 23
The Commission held that the contractual relationship be-
tween the Christiani & Nielsen parent company and its subsidi-
ary did not fall within the scope of article 85.24 According to
the Commission, article 85 applies only if there is competition
between the enterprises concerned.25 In that respect, the
Commission reasoned, it was imperative to know whether the
subsidiary was capable of autonomous economic activity.26
The Commission found that although the parent company and
the subsidiary were two distinct legal entities, the requisite
competition was lacking. 27
The Commission based its conclusion on three specific
factors. First, it focused on the fact that Christiani & Nielsen
established the two wholly owned subsidiaries as separate legal
entities, rather than branch offices or agencies, solely for busi-
ness purposes.28 Therefore, according to the Commission,
"[w]hat is involved here is an element of market strategy that
does not result in the conclusion that. . . a wholly owned sub-
sidiary is an economic entity that can compete with its par-
22. Id. at 13, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308, at
8658.
23. Id. Furthermore, many other companies existed in the Common Market
which were engaged in activities similar to those of Christiani & Nielsen. Id.
24. Id. at 14, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308, at
8659.
25. Id. The Commission's words are ambiguous. Read literally, this language
implies that article 85(1) does not apply in any case in which the enterprises do not
compete. The Commission later stated that its words are to be given a narrow inter-
pretation applicable only to the particular facts in the Christiani & Nielsen decision.
Commission Answer of October 14, 1969 to Written Question No. 190/69, 12 J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. C 135) 1 (1969).
Clearly, the literal interpretation conflicts with the well-established principle that
article 85 is applicable to vertical restraints. Typically, there is no competition be-
tween suppliers and their customers. Koppensteiner, International Enterprises Under the
Antitrust Law of the European Economic Community, 9J. WORLD TRADE L. 287, 299 (1975);
cf. van Oven, The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Paradox, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY
105, 111-12 (1973).
26. Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) at 14, [1969-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308, at 8659.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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ent."29 Second, the Commission noted that the parent com-
pany had the power to address orders to the subsidiary and to
select the subsidiary's management." This finding led the
Commission to conclude that the subsidiary was an "integral
part of the economic whole of the Christiani & Nielsen
group."'" Finally, the Commission stressed that the parent
company would be able to determine the market behavior of
the subsidiary at any time because it held all the capital of the
subsidiary.32 In sum, the Commission granted the negative
clearance on the grounds that the market sharing agreement
was merely "a division of labor within the same economic en-
tity," and therefore did "not have the object or effect of
preventing, restricting, or distorting competition within the
Common Market." 3
3
The Christiani & Nielsen decision thus exempted the coordi-
nated activity between parent and subsidiary on the basis that
the economically interdependent corporations were not capa-
ble of anticompetitive conduct. The Commission viewed the
parent and the subsidiary as separate legal entities, but it did
not consider them sufficiently independent to be capable of re-
stricting competition in the Common Market.34
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text. The Commission based this
conclusion on both economic and formal indicia of separateness. Forcione, supra
note 9, at 1424. It was clearly influenced by the formal considerations that the sub-
sidiary had a particular legal identity and responsibilities not shared by the parent.
See Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12, 14 (1969), [1969-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308, at 8659. This finding of fact led
to the conclusion that the parent and subsidiary were separate enterprises within the
meaning of article 85, and thereby constituted the necessary plurality of actors.
However, with respect to their capability of anticompetitive conduct, the Commission
weighed economic, factual criteria and held that the parent and subsidiary were not
sufficiently independent to be capable of restricting competition. Forcione, supra
note 9, 1424-26.
Forcione argues that the Commission's analysis is inconsistent. He notes that, in
dealing with the plurality of actors requirement, the Commission stressed that the
agreement was terminable only if both parties consented, but ignored the fact that
the subsidiary was obligated to follow the parent's instructions. With respect to the
requirement of anticompetitive conduct, however, the Commission emphasized the
fact that the subsidiary was obligated to follow the instructions of the parent and
ignored the terms of the contract. Id. at 1426. In doing so, the Commission did not
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Although this decision suggests that a parent company
and its subsidiary are entirely protected from the prohibitions
of article 85 when the subsidiary is incapable of autonomous
economic behavior, a close analysis of the Commission's rea-
soning reveals that the Christiani & Nielsen holding does not
mandate such a broad economic unity doctrine. First, it is im-
portant to recognize that the Commission viewed the parent
company and the subsidiary as separate enterprises constitut-
ing the plurality of actors required for an article 85 violation. 3 5
This implies that the practices between a parent company and
its subsidiary are presumptively subject to the provisions of ar-
ticle 85. According to this analysis, the applicability of article
85 to intra-group practices turns solely upon the capacity of
the corporations to engage in anticompetitive concerted activ-
ity.
Second, in assessing whether the related entities were ca-
pable of anticompetitive conduct, the Commission limited its
analysis to whether the related entities were capable of restrict-
ing competition between themselves. 36  In taking this ap-
proach, the Commission failed to consider that article 85 is
concerned not only with competition between the parties to
the agreement or concerted practice, but also with competition
between those parties and independent third parties. Thus,
Christiani & Nielsen leaves open the question of whether restric-
tion on competition outside the corporate group would justify
the application of article 85 to intra-group practices.
Christiani & Nielsen, therefore, does not support a broad
doctrine of economic unity. Rather, the decision stands for the
consider the economic, factual circumstance that the subsidiary was fully dependent
on the parent as equally influential in connection with both the plurality of actors
requirement as well as the anticompetitive conduct requirement. Id.
In any case, Christiani & Nielsen suggests that the Commission will not consider
separately constituted entities as a single enterprise even when they are economically
interdependent and will assess the applicability of article 85 solely in terms of the
extent to which the affiliated companies are capable of anticompetitive conduct. See
Mestmicker, Competition and Concentration in the EEC, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615, 630
(1972). But see Forcione, supra note 9, at 1424. Forcione argues that the Commission
did not hold that separate related entities will always be considered separate enter-
prises for the purposes of article 85(1). He suggests that in the absence of a seem-
ingly arms-length agreement, the result might have been different. Id.
35. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 111; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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narrow proposition that article 85 does not apply to agree-
ments or concerted practices between a parent company and
its wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary when the anticom-
petitive effects are internal to the corporate group and when
there is ample competition in the relevant market. 8
In Kodak,39 the Commission contradicted the approach it
had taken one year earlier in Christiani & Nielsen. Rather than
focusing on the restriction on competition, the Commission in
Kodak emphasized that article 85 requires an agreement or
concerted practice betwen two or more enterprises.40 Kodak
concerned a request by the European subsidiaries of the Amer-
ican Eastman Kodak Corporation for a negative clearance 4'
with respect to their sales conditions in Europe.42 These sales
conditions had been applied on instruction by the parent com-
pany.43 In its ruling, the Commission examined the relation-
ship between the parent company and its subsidiaries as well as
the relationship between the subsidiaries themselves.44 The
Commission found that the Kodak subsidiaries could not act
independently because they depended exclusively and com-
pletely on the parent company.45 In addition, the parent com-
pany had actually exercised its power over the subsidiaries by
issuing precise instructions regarding the exact business terms
the subsidiaries should adopt.46 These findings led the Com-
mission to conclude that the identical nature of the sales condi-
tions of the Kodak subsidiaries was not the result of "an agree-
ment or concerted practice either between the parent company
and its subsidiaries or between the subsidiaries inter se."'47
38. See Forcione, supra note 9, at 1426.
39. 13J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), (1969-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378.
40. Id. at 25, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378, at
8818-19; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 19.
42. Kodak, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), [1969-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378. These sales conditions re-
quired that goods purchased from a subsidiary for export be paid for not at the sell-
ing subsidiary's normal price but at the price charged by Kodak's subsidiary in the
country to which the goods were to be reported. Id.
43. Id. at 25, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378, at
8818.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Thus, in Kodak, in contrast to Christiani & Nielsen, the Com-
mission started from the assumption that the article 85 re-
quirement of an "agreement" or "concertation" of action re-
quires the coordination of two wills. 48 Once it found that the
subsidiaries did not enjoy economic autonomy, it concluded
that such independent conduct was lacking.4
9
Although this failure to find an agreement in Kodak im-
plies that article 85 does not apply regardless of any restriction
on competition,50 the Commission nevertheless examined the
contents of the sales conditions imposed upon the Kodak sub-
sidiaries by the parent company to determine the impact these
sales conditions would have on competition within the Com-
mon Market.5' The Commission justified an article 85 analysis
of the sales conditions on the ground that they were necessar-
ily the subject of a contract between the Kodak subsidiaries
and each of their dealers.52 However, there is no indication
that the Commission identified an agreement between the Ko-
dak subsidiaries and their dealers, for it did not state that the
contracts between the subsidiaries and their dealers contained
a concludent obligation to discriminate.5 3 Only after Kodak
modified the sales conditions did the Commission grant the
negative clearance.54 Thus, for the purposes of article 85, the
Commission found the required agreement or concerted prac-
tice between the Kodak parent company and its wholly-owned
55
subsidiaries.
48. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 299. This approach is not consistent
with the Commission's reasoning in Christiani & Nielsen when it implied that, as sepa-
rate legal entities, the subsidiaries were capable of cooperating. See supra notes 24-33
and accompanying text.
49. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 299.
50. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 293; van Oven, supra note 25, at 114.
51. Kodak, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) at 25-26, [1969-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 9378, at 8818.
52. Id.
53. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 293. But cf. Mestmicker, supra note 34,
at 630. Mestmicker argues that the Commission focused primarily on the contrac-
tual relationships of the subsidiary with its customers in the Common Market. See id.
54. Kodak, 13J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) at 26, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378, at 8818-19.
55. See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 315.
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B. Court of Justice Judgments
In 1971, in Biguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import-Export56
the Court of Justice first addressed the applicability of article
85 to practices between related entities. In that case, a Japa-
nese producer of lighters had made the Belgium company
B~guelin its exclusive distributor for Belgium and France.
Be'guelin (Belgium) then assigned its rights to the exclusive
concession for France to a wholly owned subsidiary, B~guelin
(France). 58 The District Court of Nice asked the Court ofJus-
tice pursuant to article 177 of Treaty of Rome59 whether the
transfer of the exclusive distribution agreement constituted an
infringement of article 85. The Court found that article 85 did
not apply because it was impossible for the parties to com-
pete.60 It stated:
Article 85(1) prohibits agreements which have as their
object or effect an impediment to competition. This is not
the position in the case of an exclusive sales agreement
when in fact the concession granted under that agreement is
in part transferred from the parent company to a subsidiary
which, although having separate legal personality, enjoys no
56. 1971 CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81.
57. Id. at 951, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 83.
58. Id.
59. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, empowers the Court to hear
matters implicating Community law which arise in the course of litigation in national
courts. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to render ajudgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter to the
Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
60. See B~guelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import-Export, 1971 C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 949, 958, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81, 95.
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economic independence. 61
In this judgment, the Court strongly endorsed the Com-
mission's reasoning in Christiani & Nielsen.62 As in that case,
the Court in Biguelin proceeded from the assumption that the
economically interdependent subsidiary was an enterprise
within the meaning of article 85 and therefore was capable of
concluding legally valid agreements with its parent.63 It then
focused exclusively on the degree of competition between the
participating enterprises thereby limiting its analysis to
whether the entities were capable of restricting competition
between themselves. 64 Beguelin, therefore, does not stand for
the proposition that practices between a parent company and
its economically interdependent subsidiary are categorically
exempt from the prohibitions of article 85.65 Rather than es-
pousing such a broad economic unity doctrine, the judgment
suggests that the Court deliberately reserved the right to apply
article 85 to such a parent subsidiary relationship. 66 Other-
wise, the Court need not have considered the restriction on
trade since it could have confined itself to the consideration
that coordinated activity or arrangements between a parent
company and its controlled subsidiary are entirely protected
from the finding of an agreement or concerted practice in vio-
lation of article 85.67
In a judgment three years after Biguelin, the Court again
focused on the article 85 prerequisite of a restriction on com-
petition within the Common Market. In Centrafarm v. Sterling
Drug Inc.,68 the agreement at issue concerned the grant of an
exclusive patent distributorship by a United States parent com-
pany, Sterling Drug, to its wholly owned subsidiaries in Britain
and the Netherlands. 69 The subsidiaries sought to use the pat-
ent for the purposes of opposing imports of the product into
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
63. See Mestmficker, supra note 34, at 630.
64. Id.
65. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 114.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8246.
69. Id. at 1149, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at
9151-46-9151-47.
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the Netherlands from England by a third party, Centrafarm.7 °
One of the questions submitted to the Court by the Dutch
Hoge Raad7 1 was whether article 85 applied to agreements and
concerted practices between the patentee and licensees, if the
aim of the agreements or concerted practices was to differenti-
ate market conditions for the patented goods in the different
states. 72 The Court held that article 85 does not apply to:
agreements or concerted practices between undertakings
belonging to the same concern and having the status of par-
ent company and subsidiary, if the undertakings form an
economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real free-
dom to determine its course of action on the market, and if
the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the
internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings. 73
Thus, the Court upheld the Commission's position in Christiani
& Nielsen 74 that article 85 does not apply to agreements be-
tween interdependent companies if they concern merely the
internal allocation of tasks within the group.75
C. Economic Unity: A Limited Doctrine
The holdings in Christiani & Nielsen, Kodak, Beguelin and
Centrafarm highlight two important factors that the Commis-
sion and the Court ofJustice consider when assessing whether
affiliated firms are capable of violating article 85. The first is
the existence of economic unity. 76 Although the Commission
and the Court apparently consider affiliated companies as sep-
arate enterprises for the purposes of article 85, 77 a finding of
70. Id.
71. The Hoge Raad is the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. It referred this
question to the Court under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. See supra note 59.
72. Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1151, [1974 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at 9151-47.
73. Id. at 1168-69, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at
9151-57-58.
74. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
75. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 128-29. The Commission in Christiani & Nielsen
did not use this precise language but the implication is the same. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
76. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 129.
77. See, e.g., Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246; Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
165) 12 (1969), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308.
These cases stand for the proposition that companies of the same group may see
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economic unity inevitably leads to the conclusion that the affili-
ated companies are incapable of restricting competition be-
tween themselves.78 Therefore, in a relationship between a
parent company and its economically interdependent subsidi-
ary article 85 is to some extent inapplicable. However, be-
cause article 85 is concerned with competition among all mar-
ket participants and not only with competition between the
parties to an agreement or concerted practice, 79 a second fac-
tor is relevant to the analysis. The second factor is whether the
intra-group practices restrict competition between the concern
companies and independent third parties.8 0
Although this differentiated approach permits the applica-
tion of article 85 to intra-concern practices even when eco-
nomic unity exists between the affiliated firms, the Commission
and the Court of Justice have nevertheless demonstrated a re-
luctance to subject single-firm behavior to article 85 liability.
Indeed, while the intra-group arrangements or concerted ac-
tivities in many cases did have external effects, the Commission
and the Court of Justice still exempted the practices from the
prohibitions of article 85. For instance, in Christiani & Niel-
sen, 8 as a result of the market sharing arrangement, potential
customers outside the Netherlands were prevented from buy-
ing from Christiani & Nielsen. Even if ample competition did
exist, as the Commission noted,82 price differentials for the
products in question may have restricted the competitive posi-
tion of non-related third parties.8 3 Therefore, it remains un-
certain under what circumstances practices between related
their agreements subject to scrutiny under article 85(1) if they concern subjects other
than allocation of tasks within the group. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Such scrutiny can only take place if each is a separate enterprise for the purposes of
article 85(1). B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 74. Moreover, in Kodak, 13J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9378, the fact that the Commission abided by the strictly legal notion of
enterprises, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, and Biguelin, 1971 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81, does not contradict this interpreta-
tion. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
78. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 129.
79. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 111; van Rijn, supra note 15, at 129-30; supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
80. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 130; Forcione, supra note 9, at 1423.
81. 12J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2412.26.
82. See supra note 23.
83. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 293-94.
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firms will have substantial effects outside the corporate group
sufficient to trigger a finding of an agreement or concerted
practice in violation of article 85.
Two recent decisions, Kawasaki84 and Johnson &Johnson, 5
provide further evidence of the Commission's reluctance to
find an agreement between economically interdependent
firms. These decisions concerned the application of article 85
to restrictions imposed upon dealers by wholly owned British
subsidiaries ofJapanese and United States multinational enter-
prises.8 6 In both cases, an affiliated German company pro-
vided assistance in enforcing the restrictions.87 Analyzing the
restrictive practices similarly, the Commission, in both in-
stances, readily found an article 85 violation by identifying an
agreement between the subsidiaries and the restrained deal-
ers.8 8 While in Kawasaki the fine was imposed only on the Brit-
ish subsidiary, in Johnson &Johnson, the parent company, the
British subsidiary, and the German company were jointly and
severally fined.8 9
84. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 9 (1979), 24 Common Mkt. L.R. 448.
85. 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16 (1980), 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 287.
86. Johnson &Johnson, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 16-17, 31 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 289-9 1; Kawasaki, 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 9, 24 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 450.
87. Johnson &Johnson, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 17, 31 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 291; Kawasaki, 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 9, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. at
450.
88. Johnson &Johnson, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 23, 31 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 297; Kawasaki, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 14, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. at
457. In both cases, the Commission defined the agreement as the restrictive sales
contract between the subsidiaries and their respective dealers, but in neither case did
the Commission join the dealers in the suit. In Kawasaki, the Commission stated that
the dealers had no interest in enforcing the ban because it was a restriction on their
commercial freedom. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 14, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. at
457. In Johnson &Johnson, the Commission similarly justified its refusal to include the
dealers in the suit by stating that "[t]he restrictive agreements with the [dealers] were
only the vehicle for this protective policy, which was indeed contrary to the interests
of those [dealers]." 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 23, 31 Common Mkt. L.R. at
296.
89. Johnson &Johnson, 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 27, 31 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 304; Kawasaki, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 16, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. at
460. There is a discrepancy in these two decisions with respect to imposition of lia-
bility. The Commission's finding in Kawasaki that the subsidiaries and the parent
company form "one economic unit" seems inconsistent with the imposition of a fine
only on the subsidiary. As one economic unit, the conduct of the subsidiary should
have been regarded as the conduct of the parent company for the purposes of article
85. For a discussion of the economic unity doctrine in the context of imputation of
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These decisions can be seen as an indirect and informal
condemnation of the group policy of maintaining and protect-
ing national markets.90 However, it is important to note that
the Commission deliberately defined the subsidiaries as sepa-
rate enterprises and identified the agreement as existing be-
tween the members of the concern group and an independent
third party.91
D. The Criteria for Economic Unity
Assuming that the Court and the Commission have at least
partially repudiated the application of article 85 to the rela-
tions between economically interdependent firms, it still re-
mains to be seen under what circumstances a parent company
and its subsidiary or sister subsidiary companies will be consid-
ered one economic unit. For instance, in Christiani & Nielsen,02
one basis for the Commission's finding of economic unity was
that the parent company could have set up branch offices
rather than legally independent subsidiaries.93 This suggests
that complete ownership of capital is an important considera-
tion in assessing whether the related entities form one eco-
nomic unit. However, in Christiani & Nielsen, the Commission
also argued that the parent company had the power to control
the subsidiary's management.9 4 This argument indicates that
the parent company's mere power of control over its subsidiary
may justify a finding that the two are an economic entity.95
Other cases further evidence the confusion regarding the
criteria for economic unity. For instance, in Kodak,96 the actual
exercise of power by the parent company was the decisive fac-
substantive liability to foreign enterprises for the conduct of a local subsidiary, see B.
HAWK, supra note 2, at 51-54; Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 309-13.
90. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 124.
91. See Johnson &Johnson, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) at 23, 31 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 297; Kawasaki, 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) at 14, 24 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 457. One commentator has suggested that the Johnson &Johnson decision
could be interpreted as finding an agreement between three wholly owned subsidiar-
ies. See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 75.
92. 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308.
93. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
95. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 295.
96. 13J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), [1969-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378.
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tor in the Commission's determination that the subsidiaries
were incapable of autonomous economic activity. 97 In Cen-
trafarm98 and Be'guelin,99 however, the Court of Justice found
that the subsidiaries did not enjoy economic autonomy, pre-
sumably on the sole basis that they were wholly owned.' l 0
Therefore, these decisions do not indicate whether 100% own-
ership, the possibility of control or the actual exercise of power
supports a finding of economic unity that may result in an arti-
cle 85 exemption for the intra-group practices.
A recent case, Flat Glass,10 1 raises further questions about
the degree of control necessary for there to exist economic
unity between the companies of the same group. In that case,
the Commission held that two parent companies, Saint-Gobain
and BSN, and their respective subsidiaries, Glaceries de Saint-
Roch and Glaverbel, violated article 85 by restricting competi-
tion in the Benelux countries.'0° The restrictive practices in-
cluded price fixing, market sharing and exchanges of detailed
information to ensure compliance with the unlawful agree-
ments.' 0 3 In its ruling, the Commission failed to invoke the
economic unity doctrine'0 4 and imposed fines on both the par-
ent company and the individual subsidiaries. One of these
subsidiaries was wholly owned and the other was majority-
owned.' 0 5 The Commission reasoned that the parent should
97. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
98. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8246.
99. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 58 and 69.
10 I. Agreements and concerted practices in the flat-glass sector in the Benelux countries (Flat
Glass), 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 212) 13 (1984), [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,612.
102. Id. at 22, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,612, at 11,474.
103. Id. at 14-18, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
$ 10,612, at 11,465.
104. Although the Commission did not explicitly invoke the economic unity
doctrine, it did emphasize the degree of independence enjoyed by the subsidiaries.
This approach is consistent with the economic unity doctrine.
105. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 212) at 13-14, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,612, at 11,466-467. Through its Belgian holding
company, BSN wholly owned Glaverbel and another subsidiary until May 1981. In
May 1981, BSN sold 80% of the two companies' equity to a Japanese group, Asahi
Glass. At the time of the decision, Asahi owned 78% of Glaverbel. Saint Roch was
majority-owned during the relevant period by Saint-Gobain. Saint-Gobain's stake
was 50.05% until 1982 when it rose to 66.5% Id.
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be apportioned some of the responsibility because "the in-
fringements were part of arrangements devised at group
level."' 6 With respect to subsidiaries, the Commission stated
that they must also be apportioned some of the penalty "in
view of the degree of independence they enjoyed and the ac-
tive part they played in setting up and monitoring the agree-
ments and practices." 107
While the Commission may have based the violation on a
horizontal conspiracy between the parent companies, it did not
carefully delineate the parties between whom the agreement or
concerted practice was found. The Commission clearly identi-
fied the subsidiaries as separate enterprises and vaguely re-
ferred to the coordinated activity between all parties involved
as agreements within the meaning of article 85.108 Thus, the
decision can conceivably be interpreted as finding the required
agreement between the parent companies and their respective
subsidiaries.
The Commission's reasoning supports this conclusion.
Indeed, the Commission determined that, even though the
parent company wholly owned one of its subsidiaries, the sub-
sidiary had freedom in the management of its affairs sufficient
to be capable of autonomous behavior.'0 9 In addition, the
Commission found that, despite evidence that the parent as-
serted its power over the subsidiaries, control was effectively in
independent hands." 0 Although previous decisions are not
entirely clear, both of these findings could support the conclu-
sion that the intra-group practices violated article 85 because
the related firms did not constitute an economic entity.
Flat Glass, therefore, suggests that the Commission will as-
106. Flat Glass, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 212) at 21, [1982-1985 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,612, at 11,474.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 18, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,612, at 11,470.
109. Id. at 21, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,612, at 11,474. This finding is consistent with the Commission's holding in
B.M.W. v. Commission of the European Community, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2435, 2475-76 [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8548, at
7878, where it stated: "The bond of economic dependence existing between a par-
ent company and the subsidiary does not preclude a divergence in conduct or even a
divergence in interests between the two companies." Id.
110. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 212) at 21, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,612, at 11,473-474.
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sess whether economic interdependence exists between affili-
ated firms by focusing on the degree of leeway a subsidiary is
given in managing its affairs. Ownership of capital, power of
control or actual exercise of control, although contributing fac-
tors, apparently are not the decisive criteria for determining
economic unity.
II. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH
A LIMITED ECONOMIC UNITY DOCTRINE
The notion of a limited economic unity doctrine presents
practical and theoretical difficulties. As a practical matter, a
limited economic unity doctrine exempting only arrangements
concerned "merely with the internal allocation of tasks"'1
would make almost every parent-subsidiary organization ille-
gitimate. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an internal deci-
sion that does not, in some sense, restrain trade outside the
corporate group.'12 Any agreement or coordinated action with
respect to such issues as pricing, market or customer allocation
could result in a violation of article 85.11 This approach
merely limits the finding of an agreement or concerted practice
without providing clear guidelines for determining whether
the concerted activity by related corporations violates article
85.
Furthermore, competition policy should not depend upon
an enterprise's choice of corporate structures. An enterprise
with subsidiaries controlled by the parent does not differ func-
tionally or substantially from a single corporation with distinct
divisions."l 4 Because divisions within a single corporation can-
I11. Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, 1167, [1974 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at 9151-58; cf. Christiani & Nielsen, 12J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2412.26.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83; Forcione, supra note 9, at 1437;
Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 293; Note, 'Conspiring Entities' Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 733 (1977).
113. See Forcione, supra note 9, at 1437; Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 293;
Note, 'Conspiring Entities' Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV. 661, 663
(1982); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested
Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 727 (1977).
114. See Forcione, supra note 9, at 1432; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 733 n.95
(1977).
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not agree with each other or with the corporation," 5 the mere
fact of separate incorporation should not justify the application
of article 85. To find an agreement between separate corpora-
tions of the same group is to elevate form over substance."
t6
There are also legitimate business reasons why an enter-
prise might structure its organization in the form of a parent
corporation with separately incorporated subsidiaries."t 7 For
example, the use of subsidiaries can facilitate overseas opera-
tions, provide managerial incentives, maintain goodwill associ-
ated with particular units of a firm, and promote access to capi-
tal markets."t 8 Finding an agreement among affiliated firms
when the parent controls the operations of the subsidiaries
would discourage firms from seeking these socially beneficial
advantages that can be achieved from a parent-subsidiary or-
ganization. "9
Finally, the purpose of article 85 is to prevent distortion of
competition. 20 Therefore, it can only be intended to apply to
persons who are capable of independently determining their
policy with respect to competition.' 2 ' If an entity has no ability
to determine its own market behavior, a rule of law that pro-
hibits it from acting in a particular manner is meaningless.
22
Consequently, an article 85 violation should be found only if
the persons or entities are sufficiently independent to carry on
their own business. 23 Economic substance, and not legal
form, should be the decisive and only criterion for determining
the applicability of article 85 to intra-group practices. 24
115. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
116. See Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 294. Koppensteiner suggests that
"from a policy point of view it makes no sense to apply Article 85 if the addressees
are able to avoid the impact of the law by just changing the corporate structure of the
subsidiary into a mere branch of the parent company." Id.
117. McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183, 186 (1955).
118. Id.
119. See Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Sug-
gested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 738 (1977).
120. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 117; Commission Decision of July 16, 1969,
2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9313, at 8679; Conclusions of Avocate General Roe-
mer in Consten & Grundig, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7669 (1966).
121. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 117; Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 294.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 117; Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 297.
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One commentator has suggested that article 85 should ap-
ply in certain circumstances to agreements or concerted prac-
tices between economically interdependent entities when they
have the potential of directly affecting the main goal of the
EEC, the integration of national markets into a common mar-
ket.' 25 To exempt intra-group practices from the prohibitions
of article 85, however, is not tantamount to permitting large
corporate enterprises to divide up the national markets among
their respective subsidiaries. 26 For example, if a parent-sub-
sidiary organization implements a policy of regional price dif-
ferentiation and the price differentials between two countries
are large enough, customers of the subsidiary operating in one
country can import the goods into the other country.' 2 7 Arti-
cle 85 clearly prevents the parent-subsidiary organization from
avoiding this eventuality by enjoining dealers from exporting
the concern articles. 28 Furthermore, Community law forbids
concern companies from partitioning the Common Market
through the manipulation of parallel patents, 29 copyrights 130
or trademarks. '31
125. See van Rijn, supra note 15, at 130-38. van Rijn argues that article 85(1)
should be applicable to market partitioning practices that exceed the normal alloca-
tion of markets and aim to isolate markets within the EEC. He advocates the applica-
tion of article 85(1) to direct or indirect export prohibitions or measures hindering
parallel imports. Id.; see Schr6ter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to Distri-
bution Agreements - Principles and Recent Developments, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
375, 392 (B. Hawk ed.). Schr6ter interprets the general rule that article 85 may apply
to agreements or concerted practices within a group if they concern something other
than the internal allocation of tasks. He states that it might be a violation of article
85(1) if a parent company and its subsidiary had an exclusive distribution agreement
and the parent ordered the subsidiary not to fill orders coming from other EEC mem-
ber states where another subsidiary was responsible for distribution. But see Holley's
Response in Panel Discussion on Distribution Under EEC Law in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 503, 512 (B. Hawk ed.) (expressing the view that Schr6ter's interpretation does
not necessarily reflect present Commission enforcement policy).
126. Koppensteiner, supra note 25, at 300.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g.,Johnson &Johnson, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16 (1980), 31
Common Mkt. L.R. 297; Kawasaki, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 9 (1979), 24 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. 448.
129. See, e.g., Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1147, 1167, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246 (applying article 36).
130. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft GmbH v. Metro-SB-Gross-
markte GmbH, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. 8106.
131. See, e.g., Centrafarm, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1147, 1167, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246; Van Zuylen Frbres v. Hag A.G., 1974 E.
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III. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING
THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 85 TO
PRACTICES BETWEEN RELA TED COMPANIES
The applicability of article 85 to agreements or concerted
activity between affiliated firms should be assessed by focusing
upon the degree of managerial control the parent company ex-
ercises over its subsidiaries. Such an approach is consistent
with past Commission decisions and Court of Justice judg-
ments and furthers the policy goals of the Community without
exceeding the intended scope of article 85.
If a parent company controls the day-to-day operations of
its subsidiaries, an agreement should not be found on the basis
of coordinated activity between them. Even though a fictional
plurality exists in separate corporate entities, several con-
trolled companies belonging to the same group act as a single
company whose actions are guided by one corporate con-
sciousness.' 32 Therefore, such companies should be viewed as
a single entity, whose various parts are incapable of conspiring
with one another.133
A standard based on day-to-day control is consistent with
the central purpose of article 85, the prohibition of concerted
action among two or more independent entities.' 34 Implicit in
article 85 is the notion that the agreement must be among in-
dependent competitive units, that is, an agreement between
two or more independent forces on concerted action or re-
straint. 135 If a parent company controls the daily behavior of a
subsidiary, there is no justification for article 85 scrutiny be-
cause no such disparity of interests exists.
Support for a theory based on control can also be found in
cases that seek to hold the parent liable for the behavior of its
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230. A
parent-subsidiary organization's manipulation of its trademark for the purposes of
achieving territorial division may also be a violation of article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome as an abuse of a dominant position. See infra note 140; van Oven, supra note
25, at 116.
132. See Mestmicker, supra note 34, at 632-33; Ellis,Joint Venture Intra-Enterprise
Arrangements and Horizontal Arrangements Between Independent Companies, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONFERENCE ON ANTITRUST AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 95 (1963).
133. Id.; cf. van Oven, supra note 25, at 117.
134. See van Oven, supra note 25, at 116-17.
135. Id.
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subsidiary.'36 If day-to-day control exists, the Commission and
the Court of Justice disregard the form of independent entities
and, on the basis of the substance of the relationship, hold the
parent company liable.' 37 Acceptance of a control standard in
this context supports its application to the finding of an agree-
ment or concerted practice between two or more entities, for it
is inconsistent to consider the parent and subsidiary as in-
dependent entities only for the purposes of creating the plural-
ity required under article 85.138
Furthermore, applying article 85 to a parent-subsidiary
enterprise is unlikely to alleviate anticompetitive behavior in
the Community. Such an application would only encourage a
parent-subsidiary organization to consolidate into a single en-
tity with divisions and forego the advantages of a parent-sub-
sidiary structure. 139 A better method of preventing market
partitioning and other practices that contravene the EEC's
goal of market integration would be to apply article 86140 to
unilateral restrictive practices of a single firm that has a domi-
136. See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161. The Commis-
sion, in considering the possibility of imputing the subsidiaries activities to the parent
company, stated:
When a subsidiary company does not enjoy any real autonomy in the deter-
mination of its course of action on the market, the prohibitions of Article
85(1) E.E.C. may be considered inapplicable in the relations between it and
its parent company, with which it then forms a single economic unit.
See also Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 17 O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299)
51 (1974), 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309; Community v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 19 O.J.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 223) 27 (1976), 18 Common Mkt. L.R. D25.
137. Id
138. But cf. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 54. Hawk suggests that "[tihe policies
underlying these . . . issues may not be sufficiently similar to permit a single stan-
dard." Id.
139. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
140. Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49 (unofficial English translation).
The official English version of article 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Part II) (Cmd.
5179-11) reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as in-
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nant position in the Common Market.
41
CONCLUSION
Under a doctrine of economic unity, the Commission and
the Court of Justice have suggested that agreements and coor-
dinated activity between a parent company and its subsidiaries
or between sister subsidiary companies are exempt from the
prohibitions of article 85 when the subsidiary does not deter-
mine its own market behavior. A careful analysis of the rele-
vant Commission decisions and Court judgments, however, in-
dicates that the economic unity exemption to the prohibitions
of article 85 is a narrow one. Indeed, economic interdepen-
dence has not been the only relevant factor in assessing the
applicability of article 85 to coordinated activity between re-
lated firms. In addition to economic interdependence, both
the Commission and the Court have examined whether the
agreements restrict competition between the concern compa-
nies and independent third parties. In so doing, the Commis-
sion and the Court have reserved the right to apply article 85
to agreements or coordinated activity between related firms if
the agreements concern something other than the mere inter-
nal allocation of tasks between the enterprises.
This approach, however, provides no clear guidelines for
determining the applicability of article 85 to intra-group prac-
tices and is inconsistent with the purpose of article 85, which is
to prevent the distortion of competition by persons who are
capable of independently determining their policy with respect
compatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
Id. For an analysis of article 86, see Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Posi-
tions in European Community Antitrust Law, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L. FORUM 1 (1979-1980).
141. It should be noted, however, that article 86 requires market dominance as
well as misuse. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
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to competition. A better approach is to assess the applicability
of article 85 to intra-group practices by examining the degree
of managerial control the parent exercises over its subsidiaries.
If day-to-day control exists, an agreement should not be found
between them because the separate entities are not sufficiently
independent to be capable of conspiring with one another.
Sarah M. Ward

